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ABSTRACT
Subscribers to cable television typically pay Franchise and Public–Educational–
Governmental (PEG) Fees. Ostensibly, these monthly fees exist to compensate 
communities for the private use of public goods and to bolster the marketplace of 
ideas. Little empirical research, however, assesses the utility of these fees as policy 
mechanisms. In this article, we track the existence and dispensation of the fees 
in the 20 largest American cities by examining their recent annual budgets. This 
provides a foundation to consider the fees’ contributions in the context of ongo-
ing legal challenges to their existence and the increase of digital television services 
beyond their purview.
Keywords: Telecommunication, PEG, franchise, democracy, local media
For decades, most cable subscribers in the United States have paid a pair 
of obscure, but not insubstantial, fees every month. Cable Franchise and 
Public–Educational–Governmental (PEG) Fees are regulated by both state 
and federal law, were historically negotiated city-by-city, and specified in 
the individual cable franchise agreements that give cable companies the 
legal right to offer paid television services within specific communities. 
According to current law, these fees are only attached to traditional cable 
pay television packages and are not levied upon satellite television sub-
scriptions, broadband internet services, or “over-the-top” video products 
like Netflix (which may be subject to different taxes). Combined, the fees 
usually add 5–8 percent to each subscriber’s monthly bill. Conservatively, 
they yield many hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue for local gov-
ernments nationwide each year. The particulars of these fees are often 
opaque to consumers and it may not be immediately apparent why they 
exist in lieu of a traditional sales tax.
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Franchise and PEG Fees were originally conceptualized as a form of com-
pensation for the public provided by cable companies to defray the costs 
associated with the use of public resources.1 PEG Fees, in particular, were 
defined to provide financial support for the creation and distribution of 
grassroots, diverse media content to bolster the marketplace of ideas.2 After 
more than three decades, little is known about the way that fee proceeds are 
used by local governments though this fee regime still supersedes the appli-
cation of regular sales taxes upon cable services in most communities nation-
wide. On one hand, revenue from these fees could be used to bolster local 
communities by repairing roads and funding key elements of local informa-
tion landscapes like community media centers, coverage of governmental 
proceedings, and libraries.3 On the other hand, cities may squander these 
resources on bureaucratic offices of information policy or channel them into 
general operating funds that offer little accountability or transparency. In 
either case, their existence imposes a range of costs upon municipalities, cable 
providers, and ultimately consumers as they are negotiated and disbursed.
In this article, we systematically track the existence and dispensation of 
Franchise and PEG Fees in each of the 20 largest cities in the United States 
during one recent year. By examining annual budgets from each of these 
cities, we document the collection and allocation of these fees in as much 
detail as possible given the available public records. Our research shows 
which cities are collecting which fees and how they are allocating these 
resources. In turn, our analysis provides an empirical foundation for assess-
ing the fees’ current and future utility in the context of ongoing legal chal-
lenges to their existence and the increase of digital television services that 
exist outside their purview. Results show that these fees provide substantial 
funding to cities and that a portion of it is channeled to activities that likely 
bolster the marketplace of ideas—but the bulk of related revenue flows into 
general operating budgets. Once fee revenue enters general operating bud-
gets, it is difficult to document the activities it supports. In most cities, the 
majority of fee revenue does not appear to support communication-related 
policies or directly mitigate the costs borne by cities as a result of cable pro-
viders’ infrastructure activities. Consequently, our analysis suggests that the 
fees largely function like unrestricted sales taxes and that PEG obligations, 
in particular, are not consistently met. Given these findings, we argue that 
1. Parker.
2. Ali, Media Localism.
3. Waldman.
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regulators must find new ways to hold communities accountable or work 
to develop alternative mechanisms to pursue local information policy goals 
going forward. In the absence of such reform, the special costs imposed by 
the current fee regime are not justified by the results in many locales.
Franchise and PEG Fees: An Overview
Building the infrastructure to provide cable television is a disruptive and 
costly process. Cities cannot allow cable providers to dig up city streets 
without requiring compensation to fund their repair and an orderly pro-
cess to minimize public inconvenience. But at the same time, cable com-
panies cannot justify the large investment that building a complete local 
cable system requires without clarity regarding the costs that they will 
incur to access potential customers. To balance these interests, cities and 
cable providers negotiate franchise agreements. For cities, franchise agree-
ments ideally ensure universal access to cable for local households, enough 
revenue to cover public costs incurred as a result of the presence of a cable 
system (i.e., road repairs), and additional resources to improve the local 
marketplace of ideas. For cable companies, franchise agreements ideally 
limit both the amount of compensation to cities and the uncertainty asso-
ciated with providing paid television services within a locale. Federal law 
does not require cable companies to serve every home within local com-
munities nor does it require cities to open public land to paid television 
providers. Consequently, both sides have some leverage in the negotiation 
of local franchise agreements and, more specifically, the fees they contain.
The modern form of PEG and Franchise Fees can be traced to the 
Cable Communications Policy Act (CCPA) of 1984.4 In the wake of sev-
eral attempts by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to 
develop franchising regulations in the 1970s which were disputed on First 
Amendment grounds, Congress implemented the CCPA which estab-
lished durable legislation to guide cable system ownership, rates, content, 
and franchising agreements.5 Most germane to this research, the CCPA 
offered several specific guidelines for the Franchise and PEG Fees that local 
governments could include in franchise agreements. According to federal 
law, a Franchise Fee may be levied upon cable companies (which may, in 
4. Parker.
5. Ali, Media Localism.
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turn, pass it on to subscribers) in exchange for the use of public rights 
of way (e.g., cable lines buried beneath local roads). The Franchise Fee 
is capped by federal law at a maximum of 5 percent of the gross income 
derived from the provision of paid television services. Federal law leaves 
the allocation of this income to the discretion of individual locales. In 
addition to the Franchise Fee, the CCPA also allows local authorities to 
specify a PEG Fee.6
Conventionally, the PEG Fee is set between 1 and 3 percent of the 
gross revenue from paid television services. Traditionally, federal law did 
not cap the PEG Fee, but it mandated that proceeds from the PEG Fee 
could only be used for public access broadcasting, educational media and 
 broadcasting, government access television, and/or the capital costs of 
PEG  facilities—though enforcement procedures to ensure adherence to 
this mandate were not specified.
Even with the passage of the CCPA and the practical motivation shared 
by cable companies and local authorities to negotiate workable franchise 
agreements, Franchise and PEG Fees have engendered intermittent legal 
debate. Shortly after the CCPA’s passage, Saylor7 and Krug8 suggested that 
cable operators could be conceptualized as First Amendment speakers. 
From this perspective, Saylor, Krug, and others9 argue that cable providers’ 
speech rights are violated if the presence of either fee cannot be justified 
by a direct need for revenue that arises from the cable providers’ activities. 
This line of logic rests upon Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota 
Commissioner of Revenue, a 1983 Supreme Court ruling that found a special 
tax on the Minneapolis Star unconstitutional because the city did not need 
the additional revenue as a result of costs incurred by the operation of the 
paper. Similar logic fuels recent reinterpretation of the PEG provisions of 
the CCPA.10 Though still disputed, recent FCC rulings assert that PEG 
Fees in excess of the 5 percent Franchise Fee may only cover capital costs 
associated with PEG activities.11 Support for programming or staff must 
now be deducted from the 5 percent Franchise Fee—substantially reduc-
ing resources available for PEG content. Generally speaking, the FCC’s 
role in administering the Fees is limited to adjudicating disputes and the 
6. Goldfarb, “Public, Educational, and Governmental (PEG) Access.”
7. Saylor.
8. Krug.
9. Geller, Ciamporcero, and Lampert.
10. Goldfarb, “Public, Educational, and Governmental (PEG) Access.”
11. Federal Communications Commission.
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commission does not provide any oversight (or enforcement) regarding the 
allocation of the associated revenues.
In addition, since 2005 approximately 20 states have enacted legislation 
that shifts franchising authority to the state-level and further constrains 
Franchise and PEG Fees.12
Kentucky, for example, attempted to strip local communities of the 
ability to set fees in franchise agreements and substitute lower statewide 
Franchise (3 percent) and PEG (2.4 percent) rates—though the legislation 
was  eventually found unconstitutional by the state supreme court.13 Similarly, 
in San Francisco, annual PEG revenue decreased by nearly $600,000 
because California instituted a lower cap on the fee.14 Telecommunications 
companies—and some consumer advocates—have worked hard to 
encourage the move toward statewide franchising in order to smooth 
the entry of new competitors into local markets (and lower costs), often 
 overcoming strenuous opposition from local governments and community 
activists who fear the loss of resources.15 Meanwhile, a recent lawsuit in 
Iowa filed on behalf of subscribers leveraged the Minneapolis Star ruling to 
 challenge the legality of Franchise and PEG Fees and seek redress for fees 
that extended beyond the capital costs incurred by cities as a result of cable 
system activities.16 In Portland, Oregon, a similar lawsuit alleged that the 
city misallocated $14 million of Franchise and PEG Fee revenue,17though it 
was quickly dismissed.18 To plaintiffs in these actions, the fees have dubious 
value. The most visible use of fee revenue is sometimes risible public access 
programming and citizens may struggle to discern other uses of fee fund-
ing. In some cases, cable providers’ actions further obscure and diminish 
the value produced by the fees. For example, AT&T recently placed all 
PEG programming on a single channel accessible only through a special 
digital set-top box after navigating through multiple drop-down menus.19
Aside from the recent legal wrangling, both fees face an uncertain future 
as the public transitions from traditional cable television packages toward 
12. Goldfarb, “Public, Educational, and Governmental (PEG) Access.”
13. Kentucky League of Cities; “Excise Tax—Multichannel Video Programming Services”;
“Imposition of Tax on Gross Revenues.”
14. Waldman.
15. Ali, Media Localism.
16. Saul.
17. Rogoway, “Lawsuit Claims Portland.”
18. Rogoway, “Judge Tosses out Suit.”
19. Waldman.
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new services offered online. Subscribers to Netflix, Hulu, and other inter-
net video services do not pay Franchise or PEG Fees and, consequently, 
revenue from the fees will naturally wither without new legislation if peo-
ple substitute these services for cable. Yet, even as the media technologies 
that deliver television are changing, the public interests that motivated the 
Franchise and PEG Fees persist.
Cable Fees, Communication Policy, and Local Media
In the context of cable television, the Franchise and PEG Fees are key 
expressions of the federal government’s commitment to media localism 
and diversity.20 Local media have long been thought to be a vital compo-
nent of well-functioning democratic communities.21
Historically, theorists argued that by providing a common informa-
tion base rooted in proximate events and issues, newspapers defined and 
oriented communities toward public matters of substance.22 Subsequent 
shared conversation nurtured the cohesion and cooperation necessary for 
healthy civic and political participation.23 From this intellectual foment, 
localism and diversity emerged early in the twentieth century as media 
policy tenets adopted by the FCC during the development of electronic 
media. Ideally, regulation following these principles would ensure that 
diverse information about local matters and organizations was made widely 
accessible even if citizens relied on radio and television outlets rather than 
newspapers. In fact, a growing body of recent research24 lends empirical 
support to the FCC’s embrace of localism and diversity. This work shows 
that use of and access to local news media correlates with higher local 
political knowledge, more civic engagement, and more local political 
 participation—all outcomes that justify policy that stimulates production 
and consumption of local, diverse information.
More specifically, localism is an orientation toward crafting communica-
tion infrastructure around the needs of local communities to enrich a sense 





24. Hayes and Lawless; Mondak; Schulhofer-Wohl and Garrido; Shaker.
25. Napoli.
448        JOURNAL OF INFORMATION POLICY
The FCC’s diversity tenet is intended to produce policy that increases 
opportunities for the voices of many different community members to be 
amplified and heard.26 Throughout the twentieth century, the FCC sought 
to safeguard local, diverse media even as national and international media 
expanded. For example, the FCC long enforced ownership limits on broad-
cast (and by extension print) media outlets designed to encourage local 
control of media—though these caps have been weakened repeatedly over 
time.27 The FCC’s position in Carter Mountain Transmission Corporation v. 
Federal Communications Commission crystallizes its commitment to local 
content in regards to cable television. To protect local voices, the FCC was 
willing to fight to curb cable providers’ First Amendment rights by man-
dating that they retransmit local channels and reserve space and resources 
for public access television.
The FCC’s interest in public access television may especially be seen 
through the lens of a commitment to the diversity principle.28 In practice, 
public access facilities stimulate the creation and distribution of content 
that often falls outside of commercial boundaries because of its production 
quality, topic matter, or potential audience.29 Public access programming 
may at times be farcical, but it can also directly serve the democratic goals 
of the diversity principle.30 A vein of qualitative research shows that, at 
least in some circumstances, PEG funding provides vital support for pro-
ducing and disseminating both records of governmental activity and the 
voices of those otherwise not well represented in the public sphere.31 For 
example, PEG facilities frequently ensure multilingual access to television 
programming that is otherwise lacking. “In Minnesota, the Saint Paul 
Neighborhood Network (SPNN) offered eight programs for the growing 
Somali population in the area” and throughout the United States,  public 
access channels provided programming in “Greek, Czech, Hungarian, 
Albanian, German, French, Portuguese, Vietnamese, Chinese, Korean, 
Hmong, Farsi, Arabic, Hebrew, and Swahili.”32 At its best, this sort of pub-
lic access content empowers and activates citizens who may otherwise not 






31. Chen et al.
32. Waldman.
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The persistent, inexorable decline of traditional local media businesses 
is creating new challenges for the FCC’s commitment to localism and 
diversity. Annual reports by the Pew Research Center show sustained, 
secular declines in daily local newspaper revenue continuing for the past 
two decades—a problem that is driving newspapers to lay off reporters, 
reduce the number of local stories covered, publish less frequently and, at 
times, close entirely.33 In addition, growing corporate ownership of local 
television stations is often paired with cost-cutting measures that reduce 
newsroom staffing.34 Commercial efforts leveraging new digital technol-
ogies to fill the market for local information—such as Patch.com—have 
largely failed so far. A smattering of nonprofit approaches—some driving 
new online operations, others oriented to support legacy print media—are 
being explored across the United States.35 Some of these fledgling initia-
tives may prove successful, but they may not be easily replicated in dif-
ferent communities with idiosyncratic needs and cultures. Cultivating 
healthy local information environments in the twenty-first century is a 
vexing—and  controversial—task that looms unresolved.36
In the midst of this upheaval, many PEG facilities operating at the 
convergence of technological change and shifting audience preferences 
are finding ways to stay relevant. Case studies of communities across the 
United States show “public access stations” reformulating themselves as 
“community media centers.”37 In these facilities, the content produced—
distributed online as well as through cable systems—is an outgrowth of 
more fundamental contributions: the training and empowering of citizens 
and the creation of a locus of community. In community media centers, the 
range of activity is broad: traditional television programs and segments are 
produced, but there is also an emphasis on teaching media literacy, offer-
ing skills training, and experimenting with new technology. In sum, such 
efforts connect “ethnically diverse and economically challenged groups to 
advanced digital equipment and skills” which are then used in “empow-
ered forms of participation [by] local residents who use access resources 
to pursue wellbeing in different spheres of their lives, from community 
engagement and self-expression, to vocational and career development.”38 
33. Barthell.
34. McLean.
35. Ali and Damian.
36. Napoli and Friedland.
37. Ali, “The Last PEG.”
38. Fuentas-Bautista.
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For example, in Portland, Oregon, Open Signal—formerly Portland 
Community Media—recently invested in incubating a community of vir-
tual reality (VR) hobbyists which, in turn, fed into burgeoning VR activity 
at local advertising agencies like Wieden+Kennedy.39 Though little research 
quantifies the effects of these activities, a recent survey-based study in 
Austin, Texas found that, in spite of the rise of YouTube and other online 
platforms, “PEG channels remain a highly relevant source of information” 
particularly for African American, Hispanic, and less-educated residents.40 
So, as other local media institutions break down, at least some PEG facil-
ities—like public libraries—are evolving to serve community needs in the 
twenty-first century.
As the transition to digital media proceeds, regulatory mechanisms 
may bolster local information environments as they have in the past. For 
example, the recent expansion of low-power FM radio broadcasting is an 
attempt to use policy to stimulate the proliferation of grassroots voices.41 
Franchise and PEG Fees are an old policy mechanism that may have a 
new life in this environment. Wireline and wireless broadband internet 
services both rely upon the same public goods—land and spectrum—that 
provide the foundation for cable and broadcast media. The same logic that 
historically allowed FCC regulation of analog media in favor of localism 
and diversity can be used to justify modern policies that echo the Franchise 
and PEG Fees. But, before advocating for their extension to digital tele-
vision offerings, the utility of each fee as a mechanism for encouraging 
the foment of diverse community media activity should be assessed. As 
Anderson42 suggests, a policy’s success can best be determined by com-
paring its outcomes to the boundaries of the principles that justified its 
implementation. Localism and diversity cannot be said to be advanced by 
the Franchise and PEG Fees unless they are increasing the likelihood that 
the public is exposed to or engaged with PEG facilities.43 This can only be 
the case if Franchise and PEG Fees are reliably used to fund community 
media centers and related activities. If revenue from these fees is simply 
supporting cities’ operating budgets, then it is not being used to stimu-
late the local marketplace of ideas and other tactics to do so should be 
investigated.
39. Justen Harn, Personal communication, April 2017.
40. Chen et al., 278.
41. Dunbar-Hester.
42. Anderson.
43. Entman and Wildman; Levin.
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Research Questions
Ideally, citizens in communities across the United States could easily ascer-
tain both how much they paid in Franchise and PEG Fees and how local 
authorities allocated the cumulative proceeds. With this information, 
members of the public, academics, and policy makers could determine if 
the fees were producing satisfactory outcomes. Generally speaking, how-
ever, both sides of the fee equation are opaque: it is difficult to determine 
either how much money is collected or how it is spent. In fact, beyond 
anecdote and the occasional case study of local public access facilities, 
there is virtually no foundation for an empirical assessment of Franchise 
and PEG Fees. In order to remedy this lacuna, the research questions that 
drive this research are:
RQ1: Are Franchise Fees being collected in the 20 largest cities in the 
United States? If so, how much revenue did they yield in each city? 
How is Franchise Fee revenue spent in each city?
RQ2: Are PEG Fees being collected in the 20 largest cities in the 
United States? If so, how much revenue did they yield in each city? 
How is PEG Fee revenue spent in each city? Is this spending consis-
tent with federal mandates for PEG revenue?
Method
Public accounting of both revenue and expenditure at the local level is an 
important starting point for assessing the existence and value of Franchise 
and PEG Fees. Accordingly, this research examines annual budgets from 
the 20 largest cities in the United States.44 The largest American cities were 
examined for several reasons. First, these franchise agreements affect the 
largest number of subscribers. Second, the cumulative scale of funding 
in these large cities produces enough revenue to support more ambi-
tious investments in local information activities than may be possible in 
smaller cities. Third, these cities are scattered across the country, provid-
ing a glimpse of conditions in different states, regions, and franchising 
44. These cities were selected according to city population, not metropolitan area, because cable
franchise agreements are typically negotiated by individual cities.
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environments. Finally, a practical consideration: budget information 
related to cable activities and pertinent news coverage is much more acces-
sible for the largest cities than for smaller communities.
Analysis of municipal budgets is a challenging task. When possible, the 
most recent actual budget figures reported by each city are used in this 
analysis. Unfortunately, not all cities publish final retrospective accounting 
numbers so, for eight cities, estimated or projected budget numbers are 
used.45 While actual budget results are preferable because they document 
real revenue and expenditure patterns, budget projections are useful in that 
they are (hopefully) reflective of prior budget outcomes. Each budget was 
thoroughly inspected to determine whether or not it reported the collec-
tion of PEG and Franchises Fees and, if so, the total revenue from those 
fees. Any evidence of disbursements to cable-related and/or PEG purposes 
in these budgets is also reported here. Finally, state laws, local franchise 
agreements, and relevant news coverage were all reviewed to further con-
textualize the information in each budget. Even without financial specifics, 
these secondary sources are valuable because they document the likelihood 
of missing information in city budgets that thwarts further assessment of 
the Franchise and PEG Fees. They also allow us to distinguish between 
cities that fail to report information about fees that exist and cities that 
simply do not levy either of the fees.
The results are organized in three sections. First, we report whether 
Franchise and PEG Fees exist in each city. The fees are dependent on state 
law as well as each unique franchising agreement, so the absence of either 
fee in a budget (or in related documentation) can be the result of the 
city’s choice not to levy either fee on cable carriers or a statewide prohi-
bition against doing so. For cities that do administer fees, we then sum-
marize the total reported fee revenue and the allocations made to fund 
cable-related activities. These allocations typically go to a department or 
office that is tasked with telecommunication matters such as the collection 
and disbursements of Franchise Fees, coordinating PEG programming, 
and negotiating new franchise agreements. Finally, we use the budgets and 
other related documentation to categorize and tally city spending in three 
cable-related areas as completely as possible: administrative, infrastructure, 
and PEG-related expenditures. Administrative expenditures include utility 
45. Budget cycles also differ across cities, so the specific numbers reported in this analysis are
not all from the same year. See Appendix A for more detail on the data as well as on statewide 
legislation and local franchise agreements.
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management and staff salaries for departments charged with the operation 
of cable television-related activities. Infrastructure expenditures are out-
lays for the cutting and repair of streets and other physical maintenance. 
PEG expenditures support the production of public, educational, and gov-
ernment programming through the acquisition of video equipment, the 
training of students and members of the public, the staffing of production 
teams, and even, in the case of San Diego, library improvement. Transfers 
to the general fund—explicitly listed or implicitly occurring—are not 
included in these categories. Rollover funds from prior or to subsequent 
fiscal years are also excluded from the tabulations.
Results
Table 1 documents the collection of PEG and Franchise Fees. All 20 cities 
collected a Franchise Fee. There is also evidence that 16 of the 20 cities 
collected a PEG Fee—though nine cities that likely collect a PEG Fee 
do not report details of it in their budgets. Of the 20 cities, local fran-
chise agreements and state laws suggest that only four cities do not levy 
a PEG Fee. There is evidence that all 20 cities support at least some form 
of government broadcasting—though of those 20, only 11 provide public 
access broadcasting opportunities. Government broadcasting even in com-
munities like Phoenix which eschew PEG Fees indicates some cities use 
other resources to finance the operations of the government and perhaps 
even, in some cases, public access broadcasting. Additional detail regarding 
the PEG content made available in each city is beyond the scope of this 
analysis.
Table 2 documents cable-related revenues and expenditures to the 
extent possible using the cities’ public budgets. On the left side of the 
table, Franchise and PEG Fee revenues are specified separately. Total 
reported cable-related disbursements are listed in the center, followed by a 
breakdown of the expenditures by purpose. Revenue derived from the fees 
that remains after all reported cable-related allocations is shown in the last 
column. This money may be absorbed by a city’s general fund or saved for 
the allocation in future years toward PEG or other cable-related purposes.
Franchise Fee revenue is reported in every city except Indianapolis, 
but the precise amount collected is unclear in six cities. In several cities 
(El Paso, Jacksonville, New York City, San Antonio) cable franchise  revenue 
is lumped together with telephone franchise revenue and Dallas reports 
franchise revenue from all utilities (cable, phone, gas, etc.) in the aggregate. 
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San Francisco reports a small sum related to cable television fines, but 
it is not reporting Franchise revenue clearly. Such accounting procedures 
prevent close scrutiny of the cable fees in these communities. Setting aside 
these vagaries, the budgets document hundreds of millions of dollars 
of cable fee-related revenue across these 20 cities in just one fiscal year. 
Viewed at either the subscriber or the city level, the fees are  substantial. 
In Austin, Texas, there were 358,401 households in the city as of 2014.46 If 
Austinites subscribed to cable at roughly the national average, 45  percent 
of households—or 161,280—would have active cable connections.47 
46. United States Census Bureau.
47. Statista.
table 1 Franchise and PEG Fees








Austin Yes Yes Yes Yes
Charlotte Yes No Yes Yes
Chicago Yes Not specified Yes Yes
Columbus Yes No No Yes
Dallas Yes Not specified No Yes
Detroit Yes Yes No Yes
El Paso Yes Not specified No Yes
Fort Worth Yes Yes No Yes
Houston Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indianapolis Yes Yes No Yes
Jacksonville Yes No No Yes
Los Angeles Yes Yes Yes Yes
New York Yes Not specified Yes No
Philadelphia Yes Not specified Yes No
Phoenix Yes No No No
San Antonio Yes Not specified Yes Yes
San Diego Yes Not specified No Yes
San Francisco Yes Not specified Yes Yes
San Jose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Seattle Yes Not specified Yes No
Cities that do not specify a PEG Fee are distinct from those in which no fee exists in that relevant 
franchise agreements or state laws indicate that a PEG Fee exists—the budgets just fail to report 
information about it.
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The city collected more than $11 million in fees that year, mostly from 
the Franchise Fee which is capped at 5 percent of the gross cost of cable 
television. Dividing the amount collected for Franchise and PEG Fees by 
the approximate number of cable households suggests that, in 2016, the 
average Austin subscriber paid the city about $5.71 per month in Franchise 
and PEG Fees.
Tracing the precise revenue driven by PEG Fees is even more difficult. 
Budget documentation suggests that 16 of the 20 cities levied a PEG Fee, 
but nine of these cities do not specify PEG revenues. For these cities—
Chicago, Dallas, El Paso, New York, Philadelphia, San Antonio, San Diego, 
San Francisco, and Seattle—the absence of documented PEG Fee revenue 
does not mean that the fee does not exist or that PEG programming is 
not being produced. However, the absence of clearly stated PEG revenues 
does thwart outside oversight of their utilization. New York, for example, 
reports cable fees in the aggregate and, while support is clearly being chan-
neled to PEG facilities and purposes, it is not possible to match revenues 
and allocations. On the whole, it is difficult to track PEG revenue through 
to support for PEG-related activities and there is some evidence that the 
funds are likely underutilized. There are exceptions: Austin’s allocation for 
PEG-related activities exceeds its total reported revenue collected specifi-
cally from the PEG Fee and Seattle reports spending more than 50 percent 
of all cable-related revenue on PEG activities. Per federal law, cities are not 
required to spend all revenue in a given year, so it is possible that PEG rev-
enue and allocations flow unevenly across fiscal years (Cable Act §611(b)).
Federal law does not restrict the use of revenue derived from the 
Franchise Fee, and it is not possible to precisely account for this money 
in most cities. After tracing all specific administrative, infrastructure, and 
PEG-related expenditures listed in these city budgets, every city that reports 
collecting a Franchise Fee has unallocated revenue remaining. Eight cities 
explicitly earmark cable fee revenue for administrative purposes related 
to telecommunications; the remaining cities do not specify the source of 
funding for offices or staff that deals with communication or cable. Only 
five cities report allocations for infrastructure spending and, generally, the 
relevant expenditures are for technological investments rather than road 
repairs. Seattle stands out for its transparency: after accounting for admin-
istration costs related to cable activities, infrastructure spending, and PEG 
outlays, just 1.5 percent of its total reported cable-derived revenue remains. 
On the whole, the use of most Franchise Fee funds is unexplained. 
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Without a mandate to report what purpose Franchise Fee revenue serves, 
cities appear to largely absorb such funds into general operating budgets.
In summary, cities can be loosely divided into three categories. First, 
there are ten cities (Austin, Charlotte, Columbus, Detroit, Fort Worth, 
Houston, Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Jose, and Seattle) that clearly report 
their cable-related revenues. These cities also report cable-related allocations 
in an intelligible fashion—except Charlotte, which does not levy a PEG 
Fee and consequently has no legal requirements that proscribe the alloca-
tion of its cable-related revenue. Even among these cities, with the excep-
tion of Seattle, the majority of cable-related revenue is apparently absorbed 
into general operation budgets. At the opposite end of the spectrum, San 
Francisco is not clearly reporting cable-related revenues or expenditures: 
its accounting is very opaque. The remaining nine cities—Chicago, Dallas, 
El Paso, Indianapolis, Jacksonville, New York, Philadelphia, San Antonio, 
and San Diego—report enough information to give some insight, but little 
clarity, into their cable-related budgeting. Many of these cities lump rev-
enue driven by phone and cable service together. Several appear to report 
Franchise and PEG Fee revenue together. Most disclose only minimal 
information about related expenditures. Altogether, it appears that most 
cable-related revenue in these cities flows to general operating budgets—
but it is difficult to tally precisely how much money this is.
Discussion
Franchise and PEG Fees are vestiges of a fading technological and regula-
tory environment. Though originally positioned as compensation for the 
use of specific public resources and justified as the means to bolster the local 
marketplace of ideas, the fees function as sales taxes. Further, their negotia-
tion—often as part of local franchise agreements—creates additional costs 
that are likely passed on to consumers. As such, they deserve scrutiny: do 
they effectively promote identifiable societal benefits? More specifically, 
do they promote local and diverse content within communities across the 
country? Do they do so equitably and consistently? Are they otherwise 
nurturing communication capacity within communities? Should they be 
maintained—or adapted—as separate, freestanding fees? As new technolo-
gies and an evolving, piecemeal regulatory regime reshape these fees, these 
questions should be considered as part of a larger process to develop a 
cohesive communication policy framework for the twenty-first century.
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Despite chronically opaque accounting practices, our analysis of 
20 municipal budgets makes it clear that cities are collecting many millions 
of dollars annually in Franchise Fee revenue. There is scant evidence that 
this revenue is used to defray costs associated with cable system construc-
tion with any regularity. Though it appears that some cities channel a per-
centage of Franchise Fee revenue toward PEG-related purposes, the bulk 
of the proceeds are absorbed by general operating budgets. Most cities 
superficially account for Franchise Fee revenues, but there is a difference 
between allocating funds to “cable costs” and distinguishing between “road 
repair” and “public information staff salaries.” This vague accounting is 
entirely legal but it obscures the benefits that citizens derive from Franchise 
Fees (such that they exist). On one hand, the Franchise Fee could be used 
to support municipal (or state) funding to bolster the local marketplace 
of ideas. New Jersey, in a possible model, recently drew funding from the 
resale of television licenses to create a new fund to support community 
news.48 But, without additional regulatory intervention, the Franchise Fee 
as currently constituted simply provides fungible revenue to municipali-
ties. Thus, the additional burdens created by the special negotiation of the 
Franchise Fee typically are not justified by special benefits derived from it 
in lieu of a straightforward sales tax.
Meanwhile, PEG Fees and facilities are withering in the face of sustained 
legal pressure applied at both the state and federal level. In smaller locales, 
more than 100 PEG facilities have closed in recent years.49 In the commu-
nities studied here, there is evidence that a few cities (Seattle, Austin) value 
PEG-related activities enough to use Franchise Funds to support them. In 
most cities, however, PEG revenue is not clearly reported—which makes it 
impossible to evaluate whether legal obligations regarding the fee are being 
fulfilled. When revenue is reported, some cities (like Los Angeles) are fail-
ing to fully leverage PEG resources for public benefit. In some cases, new 
legal restrictions on PEG monies that only allow capital spending ham-
string local governments’ efforts to best utilize the funds that are collected. 
On the whole, there is a trend toward less ambitious PEG approaches 
that reduce funding and continue to transmit government meetings, but 
no longer provide for public access programming or facilities. Though a 
comprehensive survey of public access content is beyond the scope of this 
 article, it is clear that the elimination of public access programming is 
48. Rojas.
49. Goldfarb, “Updating the Statutory Framework.”
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a blow to both localism and diversity in mass media. New digital tech-
nologies and platforms like YouTube give voice to individuals and offer 
real distribution advantages, but they do not inherently obviate the need 
for community-centered information sources or facilities. Such facilities 
can empower individuals and build community ties—even among under-
served populations—in ways that are democratically meaningful. Put 
simply, reduced access to PEG facilities and content exacerbate problems 
arising from the decline of local commercial media.
Yet, the potential good offered by Franchise and PEG Fees is not 
enough alone to justify them or their extension to new digital services. As 
presently constituted, Franchise and PEG Fees act as sales taxes on certain 
television products. Educated, wealthy consumers who disproportionately 
rely on broadband to access pay-TV products like Netflix may be less 
likely to pay these fees today than other segments of the population—
hardly a fair outcome. The bulk of fee proceeds are spent by cities with-
out meaningful oversight and, according to our analysis, typically without 
connection to communication-related activities. If cities require funding 
to pay teachers or dredge harbors, the rationale for a special tax on cable 
television that requires onerous negotiation is not obvious. Rather, a host 
of other approaches to municipal taxation might be pursued. One might 
advocate for a sales tax applied to all communication products (similar to 
the approach Florida has adopted) as part of statewide franchising which 
would eliminate negotiation costs and likely benefit consumers. Perhaps 
an even better approach could be devised within the context of a graduated 
local (or state) income tax. Either way, the status quo is not ideal and cities’ 
stewardship of existing cable fee revenue does not warrant facile extension 
of the fees to new digital products.
Even at their best, PEG channels were only a complement to local 
commercial media. As the business landscape shifts for local media, the 
policy mechanisms that governments rely upon to nurture a healthy civic 
information environment must evolve. It is possible that some sort of spe-
cial communication-related fee could be a part of a regulatory approach 
to nurturing local, diverse voices. But there may be better tactics—for 
example, recent efforts to develop a unique tax-sheltered status for the 
Philadelphia Inquirer demonstrate a different way to provide public sup-
port for local media.50 Scholars51 outline many other tools that could be 
50. Meyer.
51. Ali, Media Localism.
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used to bolster local, diverse media. Open, active conversations about the 
information needs of communities and the policies most likely to meet 
them continues to be necessary—even if some parties would prefer that 
they not take place.52 Coherent policy goals and clear legal support for 
preferred mechanisms to achieve them from the federal level down would 
help remedy the fragmented, increasingly dysfunctional media regulatory 
regime that is developing today. With the continuing retreat of commer-
cial interests from the local information landscape, leadership from the 
public sector is more vital today than at perhaps any other recent moment.
Limitations
Several limitations constrain this research. First, the budgets that provide 
the foundation for our analysis often offer only partial information regard-
ing cable-related revenues and allocations. The frequent lack of pertinent 
detail in these budgets makes it impossible to follow the fee money at a 
granular level—and it underscores a persistent obstacle for government 
watchdogs. To some degree, this limitation is more of an indictment of 
municipal budgeting practices than it is of the research tactics used here. 
That said, only 20 cities in a single budget year are analyzed here—the bud-
getary practices and findings could be different had other cities been exam-
ined or a longitudinal analysis attempted. Perhaps more importantly, this 
analysis does not delve into the PEG programming produced in different 
cities. To truly assess the benefits derived from the cable-related fees, more 
information about this programming is necessary. Though there is anec-
dotal evidence that PEG funds support laudable content, current empiri-
cal research does not document the prevalence of such programming (let 
alone the size of its audience or its impact). We do not address this gap in 
the literature, which leaves it as an opportunity for future researchers.
Conclusion
Franchise and PEG Fees are at once obscure and substantial, 
 well- intentioned, and punitive. From their initial codification in the 1984 
CCPA, their ostensible purpose—to provide just compensation for the 
use of public goods by private corporations and bolster the local market-
place of ideas—was undermined by a lack of oversight and, in many cities, 
52. Napoli and Friedland.
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execution. Legislators may not have foreseen the sharp rise in the cost 
of cable, but today these fees are responsible for an increasingly onerous 
burden on cable consumers (many of whom have limited resources). In 
addition, recent regulatory and legislative actions further undercut the 
likelihood that the fees will be consistently used to provide specific, tan-
gible benefits to the public. PEG Fees—and by extension PEG facilities 
and content—are trending toward a gradual demise. Without useful PEG 
access, the conceptual tie between the fees and the FCC’s interest in media 
localism and diversity is diminished. In the absence of this commitment, 
the fees are largely reduced to an inefficient method to fund pothole repairs.
For those concerned with democracy, the plight of Franchise and PEG 
Fees is disappointing. These fees are an example of rare public resources 
earmarked for local information environments. At their best, they sup-
port community media centers which function as hubs of placemaking 
and empower diverse citizens to engage in the marketplace of ideas. It is 
conceivable that fee-related resources could have been—or could still be—
consistently used to meaningfully support public discourse in communi-
ties nationwide. But, given the gradual decline of cable and the increasing 
regulatory pressure on PEG Fees, it seems likely now that new mecha-
nisms advancing localism and diversity must be identified and embraced 
for modern digital media. Looking ahead, perhaps more energy should 
be invested in providing the vision and oversight necessary to cultivate 
healthy local information communities. The information needs of com-
munities and their citizens are critical in democratic societies and should 
not be subordinated to corporate interests or forsaken for regulatory 
expedience.
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Charlotte 2014–2015 Actual Budget
Revenues Allocations Totals Balance
$7,959,632 
Franchise Fees  
(p. 115)
None reported. $7,959,632 Revenue $7,959,632
All page numbers listed from 2017 Charlotte Strategic Plan. Franchise Fee revenue is listed as a mis-
cellaneous source of general revenue. By state law, North Carolina applies a 7% sales tax to video 
programming services (including satellite packages) and distributes the funds to local governments 
(ACM, 2011). There is no mandate to provide PEG funding and Charlotte’s budget includes no refer-
ences to PEG Fees.
Chicago 2016 Budget Forecast
Revenues Allocations Totals Balance
$29,200,000 
Franchise Fees  
(p. 12)
$656,297 Cable and 
telecommunication 







All page numbers listed from 2016 Chicago Budget overview. State law requires no less than 1% of gross 
television revenue be provided for PEG functions, but the budget does not break PEG revenue out 
separately (ACM, 2011). Chicago does not make public a complete budget that shows actual revenues 
and expenditures. Rather, it offers a full budget forecast and an annual assessment of the city’s financial 
health which uses actual data but with limited detail.
Austin 2013–2014 Actual Budget
Revenues Allocations Totals Balance
$9,216,223 










Fees (VOL 2, p. 263)
$3,344,086 
Expenditures
All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 Austin City Budget. Figures reported are for actual 2013–14 
receipts. Franchise Fees in Texas are set to 5% statewide. Reported revenue in the Austin budget also 
includes remittances from other local franchise holders who provide access to natural gas etc. The 
budget projects approximately 3% growth in receipts for 2015-16 over 2013-14. It specifically projects 
PEG revenue of $1,900,000, which is described in the budget to be 1% of gross TV receipts. This figure 
is used to estimate actual PEG receipts in 2013-14 and to estimate the television-specific franchise fee. 
To do so, the 1% PEG Fee is multiplied by 5—as mandated by state law—to estimate actual Franchise 
Fee receipts.
APPENDIX:
CABLE FINANCE DETAILS BY CITY
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Columbus 2016 Proposed Budget
Revenues Allocations Totals Balance
$9,600,000 








All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 Columbus City Budget. Columbus does not report actual 
budget items by program. Ohio state law dictates that Franchise Fees are set to 5% and PEG Fees are 
banned after January 1, 2012 (Goldfarb, 2013).
Dallas 2015–2016 Proposed Budget
Revenues Allocations Totals Balance
$27,394,587* 













$701,988 Street cut 
right of way manage-
ment (p. 220)
All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 Dallas City Budget. Dallas does not report actual budget 
figures for prior fiscal years. Dallas also aggregates fees from all providers that use the public right 
of way, including cable and electricity companies, in its budget. It reports a applying a 5% fee upon 
television services, but does not specify a separate PEG Fee (which, according to state law, should be 
1% in addition to the 5% Franchise Fee) (ACM, 2011). The Public Information Office provides PEG-
related services.
Detroit 2012–2013 Actual Budget
Revenues Allocations Totals Balance
$7,188,253 












All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2017 Detroit City Budget. Data reflects actual figures from 
2012–2013, the most recent year made available. Michigan state law sets Franchise Fees to 5% of gross 
television receipts and PEG fees are capped at 2% (ACM, 2011).
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El Paso 2014 Actual Budget













All page numbers listed from 2016 El Paso City Budget. Franchise Fee revenue includes some fees 
related to AT&T’s landline phone services. PEG Fees not specified by budget.
Fort Worth 2014 Actual Budget
Revenues Allocations Totals Balance
$6,766,484 
Franchise Fees  
(p. F-12)
$332,200 Cable 
Office Fund  
(p. H-318)
$7,966,484 Revenue $7,634,284




All page numbers listed from FY2016 Fort Worth City Budget. The PEG revenue is a forecast; only 
actual expenditures are reported.
Houston 2014–2015 Estimated Budget
Revenues Allocations Totals Balance
$23,400,000 
















All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 Houston City Budget. Figures reflect estimated actual 
results from 2014-15.
Indianapolis 2014–2015 Actual Budget
Revenues Allocations Totals Balance
$503,075 PEG Fee 
Revenue (p. 77)
$340,265 Personal services 
(p. 77)
$503,075 Revenue $0
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Los Angeles 2013–2014 Actual Budget











$5,900,541 PEG Fee 
revenue (p. 269)
$540,316 Additional 












All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 Los Angeles City Budget. 2013–2014 figures represent the 
most recent actual budget totals.
Jacksonville 2015–2016 Projected Budget
Revenues Allocations Totals Balance
$35,300,000 
Projected aggregate 






All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 Jacksonville City Budget. Actual budget totals not made 
available; projected revenue from October 1, 2015 – September 30, 2016 reported here. Florida taxes 
communication services at 5.22% in lieu of separate Franchise Fees and remits lump payments to 
localities annually. State legislation passed in 2007 legally terminated discrete PEG support as of July 
1, 2012 (ACM, 2011; Goldfarb, 2013).
Revenues Allocations Totals Balance
$127,174 Other services and 
charges (p. 77)
$32,556 Properties and 
equipment (p. 77)
$1,475 Internal charges  
(p. 77)
All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 Indianapolis City Budget. Figures are actual results from 
2014-2015. State law sets Franchise Fees at 5% or the “incumbent level” when the relevant legislation 
passed in 2006. Indianapolis’s budget makes no mention of Franchise Fees.
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New York 2014–2015 Modified Budget
Revenues Allocations Totals Balance
$167,270,000 
Franchise Fees aggre-
gated from all private 







All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 New York City Budget. New York does not report actual 
past budget totals, only modified backward-looking estimates. The Department of Information 
Technology and Telecommunications oversees franchising relationships as well as PEG activities in 
addition to a host of broader responsibilities. In aggregate, the Department has an annual budget of 
approximately $500 million and it does not specify allocations for specific programs or purposes. The 
budget contains no reference to PEG funding, though current franchise agreements with Verizon 
and Time Warner specify millions of dollars of funding for PEG purposes beyond the standard 5% 
Franchise Fee.
Philadelphia 2014–2015 Actual Budget
Revenues Allocations Totals Balance
$21,559,000 





All page numbers listed from FY2016 Philadelphia Operating Budget. Figures shown are most recent 
reported actual budget data. No information is provided about cable-related expenditures or PEG 
Fees. Philadelphia franchise agreements with Comcast and Verizon do include provisions that specify 
financial PEG support (Reyes, 2015).
Phoenix 2015–2016 Projected Budget
Revenues Allocations Totals Balance
$9,500,000 














All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 Phoenix City Budget. Only actual revenues are provided, 
so proposed figures are presented here. The Communications Office coordinates government program-
ming and receives the bulk of its funding from Franchise Fees. Granular allocations for PEG activities 
are not specified nor is there evidence of a discrete PEG Fee.
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San Antonio 2015–2016 Proposed Budget
Revenues Allocations Totals Balance
$30,700,000 









All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 San Antonio City Budget. Actual revenues not made 
available. Franchise revenue includes funds related to telephone services. No PEG-specific reve-
nue or expenditures are included in the budget, though Texas state law allows for a PEG Fee. The 
Government and Public Affairs office reports producing more than 900 PEG-programs, but does not 
document programmatic costs.
San Diego 2014–2015 Actual Budget
Revenues Allocations Totals Balance
$18,600,000 















$1,406,307 City TV 
funding (p. 158)
All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 San Diego City Budget. Actual totals from 2014–2015 are 
the most recent available. The budget references the existence of PEG-specific funding, but it does not 
specify the amount separately.
San Francisco 2013–2014 Actual Budget
Revenues Allocations Totals Balance
$2,833,639 
Reported as licenses 
and fines (p. 257)
N/A $2,833,639 Revenue N/A
Expenditures 
unknown.
All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 San Francisco Budget. Figures from 2013–2014 are the 
most recent actual data. According to California’s Digital Infrastructure and Video Competition Act 
of 2006, Franchise Fees should be 5% of gross television revenue and PEG Fees can be as much as 3% 
in addition. San Francisco is not clearly reporting the balance of either Fee, nor does it specify how it 
funds SFGovTV, which it operates through the General Services Agency – Department of Technology.
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San Jose 2014–2015 Actual Budget
Revenues Allocations Totals Balance
$9,700,000 
Franchise Fees  
(p. VI-6)
$1,538,526 PEG 










All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 San Jose City Budget. The Franchise Fee in San Jose is 
5% derived solely from subscriptions exclusive of other cable revenue sources. Franchise revenue is 
aggregated with other utility-related income in the general revenue section of the budget. No specific 
expenditures are drawn from it.
Seattle 2013–2014 Actual Budget
Revenues Allocations Totals Balance
$8,764,264 
Franchise Fees  
(p. 447)
$3,149,916 





















All page numbers listed from FY 2015–2016 Seattle Budget. Figures for 2013-2014 are the most recent 
actual data available. Seattle’s budget does not specify separate PEG revenues. Recent franchise agree-
ments (e.g. Comcast agreement effective January 1, 2016) in the city have rolled the Franchise and 
PEG Fees together into one charge that is less than the 5% Franchise Fee maximum set by the federal 
government.
